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Abstract—This paper studies the physical consequences of a
class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks
in which both state and topology data for a sub-network of the
network are changed by an attacker to mask a physical attack.
The problem is formulated as a two-stage optimization problem
which aims to cause overload in a line of the network with
limited attack resources. It is shown that unobservable state-
and-topology cyber-physical attacks as studied in this paper can
make the system operation more vulnerable to line outages and
failures.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical system, false data injection at-
tack, topology, state estimation, two-stage optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE electric power system is a complex cyber-physicalsystem and is monitored by an intelligent which includes:
(i) a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tem; and (ii) an energy management system (EMS) that pro-
cess the SCADA data. Network topology is important system
data used in various data processing modules in the EMS.
Changes in topology can result from either system incidents
or malicious physical attacks; but, in general, such topology
alterations can be detected in the cyber layer. However, a
sophisticated attacker can launch cyber attacks that alter the
topology information in an unobservable manner; furthermore,
they can also mask a physical attack via a cyber attack to
create a more coordinated attack. Such cyber-physical attacks
can result in wrong EMS solutions with potential serious
consequences. Therefore, it is instructive to fully understand
such attack consequences as a first step to thwart them.
There has been much recent interest in understanding both
the physical and cyber security challenges facing the electric
power system. While there has been focus on the consequences
of physical attacks on the system operation (e.g., [1]), those
of cyber as well as coordinated cyber-physical attacks are less
understood. In this paper, we introduce a class of unobservable
state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks in AC state estima-
tion (SE) and focus on fully understanding its consequences.
A. State of Art
False data injection (FDI) attacks: In [2], Liu et al. first
introduce a class of FDI attacks on DC SE. In [3], Hug and
Giampapa focus on FDI attacks on AC SE and introduce
a class of unobservable attacks that are limited to a sub-
graph of the networks. They demonstrate that though AC
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SE is vulnerable to unobservable FDI attacks, it requires the
knowledge of both system topology and states to launch such
attacks. More recently, the attacks in [4] by Liang et al. study
attack consequences by introducing a class of unobservable
FDI attacks for AC SE and demonstrate that such attacks can
lead to a physical generation re-dispatch and line overflow.
Topology attacks: Unobservable cyber attacks on topology
can be of two types: line-maintaining and line-removing. For
a line-maintaining attack, the attacker changes measurements
and line status information to make it appear that line that
is not in the system is now shown as active at the control
center via SCADA data; the opposite is achieved by a line-
removing attack. For both line-removing and line-maintaining
attacks, an attack can either change only topology data (i.e.,
state-preserving topology attack) or both state and topology
data (i.e., state-and-topology attack). The class of unobservable
cyber topology attacks is first introduced in [5]; however, the
analysis in [5] is restricted to a subclass of state-preserving
line-removing attacks in which an attacker changes topology
information of the system without changing the states.
Line-maintaining attacks: This sub-class of topology attacks
require both physical line outage and cyber attack to mask the
physical topology alteration and have not been studied yet
in the literature. In this work, we study the line-maintaining
cyber-physical attacks in which both physical and cyber
topology are changed by the attacker. In [6], we consider
unobservable state-preserving line-maintaining attacks (i.e.,
only topology data is changed) for which we develop an
algorithm using breadth-first search (BFS) to find the smallest
sub-network required to launch such an attack. However,
changing only topology and not changing states limits the
number of feasible lines amenable to attacks and also requires
large load shifts at the end buses of a target line. Therefore,
in this work, we determine attacks that change both state and
topology.
Attack consequences: There has been much focus on effect
of attacks on operation costs [7], [8] and electricity markets
[9], [10]; in contrast, as in [4], [11], this paper highlights
physical system consequences of cyber-physical attacks. For
cyber attacks whose goal is to effect electricity market and
physical consequences, the attacks can be modeled as two-
stage optimization problems where the first stage models the
attack design with constraints that capture attacker’s limitation
and the second stages models the system response (see [7],
[8], [11]). In this paper, we also use a two-stage optimiza-
tion problem to find unobservable state-and-topology cyber-
physical attack that can maximize power flow on a chosen line.
Furthermore, due to the combination of physical and cyber
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2attacks, we employ such a two-stage attack twice as detailed
in the sequel.
B. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we
introduce a class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-
physical attacks in which an attacker can change both cyber
state and topology data to enable a coordinated physical and
cyber attack on AC SE. Such an attack consists of a physical
attack to first trip a transmission line, followed by a cyber
attack that masks the physical attack. The goal is to overload
a chosen line (different from tripped line) while avoiding being
detected by both SE and the subsequent modules.
Our attack model also captures the realistic limitation that
the attacker can only access a sub-network of the entire power
system, and therefore, can take down a line and modify
the measurements only inside the sub-network. To this end,
we can solve a two-stage optimization problem to determine
the attack. However, since both physical attack and the re-
dispatch resulting from cyber attack can lead to state changes,
two attack vectors are required to enable the above two
state changes and ensure the unobservability of the attack.
Therefore, we formulate a two-step strategy to determine the
attack.
The second contribution of our work is to demonstrate the
consequences of the worst cyber-physical attacks determined
by the proposed attack strategy on AC SE and AC OPF.
We show that the cyber-physical attacks introduced here can
successfully lead to line overflows in the IEEE 24-bus system
with limited size of attack sub-network and load shifts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec.
II introduces the general system model. Sec. III introduces
the attack model. Sec. IV presents a two-step attack strategy
to identify the worst-case overflow attack. Sec. V analyzes
the numerical results for a test system. Sec. VI draws the
conclusion of this paper and presents the future works.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the mathematical formulation
for the various computational units of power system operation,
including system network and topology, state estimation, and
optimal power flow. Throughout, we assume there are nb
buses, nbr branches, ng generators, and nz measurements in
the system. In Fig. 1, we illustrate a typical temporal sequence
of data processing units in the cyber layer.
A. System Network and Topology
The electric power system can be represented by a graph
G = {N , E} where N and E are the sets of buses and lines,
respectively.
At the control center, SCADA collects line status data as a
nbr × 1 vector s with entries sk ∈ {0, 1} for k ∈ {1, ..., nbr}
that indicate the on and off status of circuit-breakers on each
line. The data is then passed to a topology processor to map
the real-time power system topology. Each s corresponds to a
specific system topology G.
B. State Estimation
Consider an nz×1 vector z of nonlinear measurements (for
AC SE) given as
z = h(x,G) + e (1)
where x = [θ, V ]T is the system state vector, and e is an
nz×1 noise vector which is independent of x and is modeled
as Gaussian distributed with 0 mean and σ2i covariance such
that the measurement error covariance matrix is given by R =
diag(
{
σ2i
}M
i=1
). The function h(x,G) is a vector of nonlinear
functions that describes the relationship between the system
states and measurements for a topology G.
We use weighted least-squares (WLS) AC SE to calculate
the θ and V [12]. Subsequent to SE, bad data detector use
χ2−test to detect bad data and bad data identification use
largest normalized residual method to filter the bad data.
C. Optimal Power Flow
The OPF problem can be written as
min C (x) (2)
s.t. F (x) = 0 (3)
T (x) 6 0 (4)
xmin 6 x 6 xmax (5)
where x = [θ, V, PG, QG]
T is the optimization vector with
voltage angle θ, voltage magnitude V that are both nb × 1
vectors, and active power generation PG, reactive power
generation QG that are both ng × 1 vectors; C(·) denotes the
cost function of x; F (·) denotes the equivalent constraints
(power balance constraints); T (·) denotes the inequivalent
constraints (power flow limits).
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Fig. 1. Temporal Sequence of Data Processing Units in The Cyber Layer
within Attack.
III. ATTACK MODEL
The unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attack
considered here models both a physical attack and a coordi-
nated cyber attack.
We assume the attacker has the following capabilities:
1) Attacker has knowledge of the topology G¯0 of entire
network prior to physical attacks.
2) Attacker has the capability to launch physical attack, and
observe and change measurements only for a sub-graph
3S of G0. The choice of S is described in detail in the
sequel.
3) Attacker has the capability to perform SE and compute
modified measurements for S.
4) Attacker has knowledge of the capacity and operation
cost of every generator in the network.
5) Attacker has historic data of load patterns and generation
dispatch of the entire network.
We assume that the power system is observable before and
after the physical attack.
In this paper, we focus only on physical attacks that target
transmission lines. We denote the line that is physically tripped
by the attacker as the switching attack line and the two end
buses of this line as the switching attack buses. Assume the
switching attack line is line t and the topology prior to the
physical attack is G0. The physical line status for line t changes
from st = 1 to st = 0 after the physical attack and the
corresponding physical topology changes to G.
In general, a physical attack will be subsequently detected
by the topology processing unit in the EMS and the system
topology will be updated shortly after the detection. How-
ever, a sophisticated attacker can hide such physical attacks
by launching an unobservable cyber attack. In the resulting
unobservable cyber topology attack, the attacker modifies line
status as well as related bus measurements to alter the system
topology G to a different “target” topology G¯={N, E¯}. Since
the attacker’s aim is to hide the topology alteration caused by
the physical attack, G¯ should be chosen as G0.
To launch a state-and-topology attack, the attacker injects
nbr × 1 line status attack vector b and nz × 1 measurement
attack vector a. The attack vector b for line status overrides
the physical change on line t’s status by setting for bk=0 for
k 6= t and bk=1 for k= t. These changes lead to a new system
state x¯ for the system under attack. This attack modifies (s, z)
for topology G to (s¯, z¯) for topology G¯ such that
s¯ = s+ b, and z¯ = z + a. (6)
In the absence of noise, the measurement attack vector satisfies
a = h(x¯, G¯)− h (x,G) . (7)
For nonlinear measurement model and AC SE, we model
a sophisticated attacker who attacks measurements and line
status data for a sub-graph S of the network by first estimating
the system states xˆ inside S using AC SE. The attacker then
chooses a small set of buses in S to change states from the
estimate xˆ to x¯ = xˆ + c such that the measurement vector z¯
after cyber attack has entries
z¯i =
{
zi ,
hi(xˆ+ c, G¯) ,
i /∈ IS
i ∈ IS
. (8)
where IS denotes the set of measurements inside S.
We use the following method to identify the sub-graph S
for an unobservable state-and-topology attack. Throughout, we
distinguish two types of buses: load buses with presence of
load and non-load buses with no load.
1) Use the optimization problem (the details are in the
sequel) to determine the load buses from the attack
vector c whose states need to be changed (defined as
center bus) to enable the attack.
2) Include all center buses in S.
3) Extend S by including all buses and branches connected
to the buses inside S.
4) If there are non-load buses on the boundary of S,
extend S by including all adjacent buses of the non-load
boundary buses and the corresponding branches.
5) Repeat 4) until all boundary buses of S are load buses.
6) Check if there is a path (actual bus and branch con-
nection) in S that can connect the two switching attack
buses. If such path exits, then S is the attack sub-graph.
If there is no such path, go to Step 7).
7) Use BFS method to find the shortest path connecting the
two switching attack buses. Include the shortest path in
S. Then this S is the attack sub-graph.
Steps 1)−5) ensure the boundary buses of S are load
buses with states unchanged. For a non-load bus in S, since
the injection of non-load buses are known to the control
center, the attacker should ensure that under an attack, the
net injection is equal to the net flow into the bus. Thus,
the state changes for non-load buses are dependent on those
for the neighboring load buses. Furthermore, the state of a
boundary bus j is computed using both measurements inside
and outside S. From (8), if a measurement i for i /∈ IS is
dependent on the jth state, then the corresponding jth entry of
the attack vector should satisfy cj = 0 to ensure the attack
to be unobservable. Thus, a boundary bus cannot have a state
change, and therefore, cannot be a non-load buses.
Steps 6) and 7) ensure that the states of switching attack
buses can be estimated with measurements inside S. To
maintain the switching attack line as active in the cyber layer,
the attacker needs to modify the line status as well as power
flow measurements on the switching attack line and power
injection measurements on the switching attack buses. This in
turn, requires the attacker to estimate the states of switching
attack buses to create the false measurements. However, since
this line is physically disconnected, the attacker needs to use an
algorithm such as BFS to determine an alternate shortest path
connecting the 2 switching attack buses, and thereby estimate
the states and changed measurements. In general, state change
is required for at least one of the switching attack buses.
This bus, thereby, will be included in S. However, S may
not include the entire physical path. Thus, the attacker needs
steps 6) and 7) to complete the path.
IV. ATTACK STRATEGY
In this section, we study the worst-case cyber-physical
attacks. We assume the attacks can: (a) physically trip a
switching attack line and mask the physical attack with a
cyber attack; (b) maximize power flow on a target line; and
(c) avoid detectability by limiting load shift via changes in
measurements. The attack resources available to the attacker
may also be limited. We model this limitation by constraining
the size of sub-network the attacker has access to. This leads
to a constrained optimization problem. As noted before, two
attack vectors are needed for the physical and cyber parts of
the attack and each optimization problem is described below.
4Our two-step optimization problem captures the temporal
nature of attack sequence involving a physical attack followed
by several cyber attacks.
In Fig. 2, we illustrate this temporal sequence of attack
and system events. The system events are periodic and are
denoted by St for the tth event. At the start of each St,
data is collected from SCADA and by the end of St, i.e.,
the start of St+1, data is processed in the EMS. There are 2
attacks instance, A0 and A1 to denote the physical and cyber
attack events, respectively. We assume the physical attack
event A0 is launched immediately after the start of the 0th
system event, i.e., S0, and the coordinated cyber attack event
A1 is launched shortly after, but before the start of next system
event S1. Following this cyber-physical attack pair (A0, A1),
the cyber attack is sustained between every two system events
to maintain the worst generation dispatch, and thereby, sustain
the maximal power flow on the target line. In TABLE I,
we denote how the cyber (measured) and physical (actual)
data including generation dispatch, system state, topology, and
loads vary at all system and attack events.
System and 
Attack Events0S 1S 2S TS0A 1A 2A 3A 1TA +…...
Physical attack 0A Cyber attack 1,2,..., 1TA +
Fig. 2. Time sequence of attack and system events.
TABLE I
PHYSICAL AND CYBER DATA FOR ATTACK AND SYSTEM EVENTS.
System
and
Attack
Event
E0 A0 A1 S1 A2 S2 A3 ... ST AT+1
Generation
Dispatch P
0
G P
0
G P
0
G P
∗
G P
∗
G P
∗
G P
∗
G ... P
∗
G P
∗
G
Physical
Topology G¯ G G G G G G ... G G
Cyber
Topology G¯ Gq∞G¯ G¯ G¯ G¯ G¯ ... G¯ G¯
Physical
State θ0− θ0 θ0 θ
∗ θ∗ θ∗ θ∗ ... θ∗ θ∗
Cyber
State θ0− θ0 θ0+c
0 θ∗+c θ∗+c θ∗+c θ∗+c ... θ∗+c θ∗+c
Physical
Load PD PD PD PD PD PD PD ... PD PD
Cyber
Load PD PD P¯D P¯D P¯D P¯D P¯D ... P¯D P¯D
Assume the system topology and the generation at S0 are
G¯ and P 0G, respectively. From TABLE I, we can see that
the system physical topology changes to G after the physical
attack. The physical operation states, thereby, change to θ0.
The attacker then injects cyber attack vector c0 to change the
load pattern from the physical load PD to the false cyber load
P¯D to mask the physical topology alteration. The physical
and cyber loads at attack event A1 satisfy the following
relationships, respectively:
PD=AGNP
0
G−H1θ0, and P¯D = AGNP 0G−H¯1
(
θ0+c
0
)
(9)
where AGN is nb × ng generator-to-bus connectivity matrix;
H1 and H¯1 are nb × nb dependency matrices between power
injection and voltage angle for G and G¯, respectively. When
subtracting the two equations in (9), the cyber loads are related
to the physical loads as
P¯D = PD +H1θ0 − H¯1(θ0 + c0) (10)
The false cyber load P¯D and topology G¯ leads to a system re-
dispatch to the optimal generation dispatch P ∗G at S1. Since
the attacker optimization problem at each step models the
system response, such an optimal dispatch will cause maximal
power flow on the target line. Following this first cyber attack
A1, since the generation dispatch changes at S1, the physical
system states also change to θ∗. To sustain both the optimal
dispatch P ∗G and the false cyber topology G¯ at the next system
event, i.e., S2, the attacker needs to maintain the false cyber
load P¯D by injecting another attack vector c at A2. Thus, the
nodal power balance at attack event A2 in the cyber layer is:
AGNP
∗
G − H¯1 (θ∗ + c) = PD +H1θ0 − H¯1
(
θ0 + c
0
)
. (11)
where the right hand side terms represent the cyber load modi-
fied at A1. In the following attack events, i.e., At, t = 3, ..., T ,
the attacker can keep injecting c to maintain the false cyber
load P¯D. This in turn ensures that the optimal dispatch and the
false cyber topology are maintained at P ∗G and G¯, respectively,
and the maximal power flow on the target line is sustained.
To model the cyber-physical attack events A0, A1, and A2
between S0 and S1, the optimization problem should capture
the power balance relationship shown in (11). However, since
the switching attack line is determined by the optimization
problem, both H1 and θ0 are unknown before solving the
problem. On the other hand, for the pure cyber attack events
A2 and A3, the power balance in the cyber layer is
AGNP
∗
G − H¯1 (θ∗ + c) = PD +H1θ∗ − H¯1 (θ∗ + c) . (12)
This is equivalent to the physical power balance as
AGNP
∗
G −H1θ∗ = PD. (13)
Therefore, instead of directly modeling the cyber-physical
attack events A0, A1, and A2 between S0 and S1, we can
model the pure cyber attack events A2 and A3 between S1 and
S2 to determine the attack vector c in the first step. Such a c
should be subject to bounds on both the attacker’s sub-graph
size and the load shifts. However, since the new topology H1
is still not known prior to the optimization, we replace H1
using the following equations:
H1θ
∗ = AKNPK (14)
PK = diag (s) · H¯2θ∗ (15)
where AKN is the nb×nbr branch-to-bus connectivity matrix,
H¯2 is the nbr × nb dependency matrix between power flow
and voltage angle for G¯, s is the line status vector, diag(s)
represents the diagonal matrix of s, PK is the nbr × 1 power
flow vector. In (14), the sum of physical power flows on the
set of branches connected to a bus is utilized to calculate
the physical power injection at the bus. In (15), the physical
power flow vector is represented by the diagonal matrix of
line status vector s multiply the cyber power flow vector, i.e.,
H¯2θ
∗. That is, if a line t is selected as the switching attack
5line, the power flow PKt on line t is forced to be 0, otherwise,
PKt = H¯2(t, :)·θ, where H¯2(t, :) represents the tth row of H¯2.
With these modifications, we can then model the system and
cyber attack events from A2 through S2 to A3 with a two-
stage optimization problem, and hence, the switching attack
line can also be determined as the solution of the optimization
problem. After the switching attack line and the cyber attack
vector c are both determined, the attack sub-graph S can be
identified with the process stated in Section III. The details of
this problem is described in Subsection IV-A.
In the second step, we focus on the attack vector c0 at A1.
We again use a two-stage optimization problem to determine
the c0 such that the optimal generation dispatch for this
problem is forced to be same as that in Step 1. We, henceforth,
define the attack vector solved in the second step as the initial
attack vector. The details of the second step is introduced in
Subsection IV-B.
The attack vectors c and c0 are both DC attack vectors that
can be detected by AC SE. Thus, to ensure the unobservability
of the attacks, the attacker should construct two AC attacks
with c and c0. This procedure is introduced in Subsection IV-C.
A. Step 1: Maximize Power Flow on A Line
In Step 1, we introduce a two-stage optimization problem
to determine the attack vector c and the switching attack
lines such that the target line l in the attacker’s sub-graph
S has maximal power flow subject to specific constraints as
explained in the sequel. The two-stage optimization is given
as
max PKl − ζ ‖cL‖0 (16)
s.t.
nbr∑
k=1
(1− sk) = NT , sk ∈ {0, 1} (17)
‖cL‖0 6 N0 (18)
− τPD 6 H¯1 (θ∗ + c)−AKNP ∗K 6 τPD (19)
{θ∗, P ∗G, P ∗K} = arg
{
min
θ,PG,PK
ng∑
g=1
Cg (PGg)
}
(20)
s.t. AGNPG −AKNPK = PD (λ) (21)
PK = diag (s) · H¯2θ (22)
−PmaxK 6 H¯2 (θ + c) 6 PmaxK (µ−, µ+) (23)
PminG 6 PG 6 PmaxG (α−, α+) (24)
where Cg (·) is the cost function for generator g; PG is ng×1
active power generation vector with maximum and minimum
limit PmaxG and P
min
G , respectively; PK is nbr × 1 physical
power flow vector with thermal limit PmaxK ; λ is nb × 1 dual
variable vector of constraint (21); µ∓ are nbr×1 dual variable
vectors of constraint (23), respectively; α∓ are nb × 1 dual
variable vectors of constraint (24), respectively; H¯1 is nb×nb
dependency matrix between power injection and voltage angle
for G¯; H¯2 is nbr×nb dependency matrix between power flow
and voltage angle for G¯; PD is nb × 1 physical load vector,
which has maximum load shift percentage τ ; ζ is the weight
of the norm of attack vector c; L represents the set of load
buses; N0 is the maximum number of load-buses that can
be attacked; NT is the maximum number of switching attack
lines.
The goal of the attack in (16) is a multi-objective problem
which includes maximizing the power flow on the target line
l to create an overflow, while minimizing the l0-norm of the
attack vector, i.e., minimizing the attack sub-graph size. The
power flow on l is maximized along the direction of the power
flow prior to attack. In the first stage, constraints (17)−(19)
model the following attacker limitations: (i) only up to NT
switching attack lines can be physically tripped; (ii) alter up
to N0 load-bus states; and (iii) limit cyber load shifts to at most
τPD; respectively. The second stage optimization represents
DC OPF, whose aim is to minimize operation cost in (20),
subject to power balance constraints in (21) and (22), thermal
limit constraint in (23), and generation limit constraint in (24).
This two-stage optimization problem is nonlinear and non-
convex. For tractability, we modify several constraints.
Constraint (22) is a nonlinear constraint which includes the
product of binary variable s and continuous variable θ. It can
be replaced by a linear form as follows
−PK + H¯2θ∗ 6M1 (1− s) (β−)
PK − H¯2θ∗ 6M1 (1− s) (β+)
−PK 6M1 · s (γ−)
PK 6M1 · s (γ+)
(25)
where β± and γ± are nbr × 1 dual variable vectors for the
corresponding constraints and M1 is a large number.
Constraint (18) is an l0−norm constraint on the attack
vector, which is nonlinear and non-convex. It can be relaxed
to a corresponding l1−norm constraint as:
‖cL‖1 =
∑
n∈L
|cn| 6 N1. (26)
However, constraint (26) is still nonlinear. We, thus, lin-
earize it as follows:
cn 6 un, −cn 6 un,
∑
n∈L
un 6 N1. (27)
where u is nload × 1 non-negative slack variable vector.
Once the attack vector determined by s and c is given in
the first stage optimization problem, the second stage DCOPF
problem (20)−(24) and (25) is then convex. The second stage
optimization problem can then be replaced by its Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions as follows:
∇
(
ng∑
g=1
Cg
(
P ∗Gg
))
+ λT · ∇ (AGNP ∗G −AKNP ∗K − PD)
+
[
µ−;µ+
]T· ∇([−H¯2 (θ∗ + c)
H¯2 (θ
∗ + c)
]
−
[
PmaxK
PmaxK
])
+
[
α−;α+
]T· ∇([−P ∗G
P ∗G
]
−
[−PminG
PmaxG
])
+
[
β−;β+
]T· ∇([−P ∗K
P ∗K
]
+
[
H¯2θ
∗
−H¯2θ∗
]
−M1 ·
[
1−s
1−s
])
+
[
γ−; γ+
]T· ∇([−P ∗K
P ∗K
]
−M1 ·
[
s
s
])
= 0 (28)
diag
([
µ−;µ+
])· ([−H¯2 (θ∗ + c)
H¯2 (θ
∗ + c)
]
−
[
PmaxK
PmaxK
])
= 0 (29)
6diag
([
α−;α+
])· ([−P ∗G
P ∗G
]
−
[−PminG
PmaxG
])
= 0 (30)
diag
([
β−;β+
])· ([−P ∗K
P ∗K
]
+
[
H¯2θ
∗
−H¯2θ∗
]
−M1 ·
[
1−s
1−s
])
= 0
(31)
diag
([
γ−; γ+
])· ([−P ∗K
P ∗K
]
−M1 ·
[
s
s
])
= 0 (32)[
µ−;µ+;α−;α+;β−;β−; γ−; γ+
]
> 0 (33)
where constraint (28) is the partial gradient optimal condi-
tion, (29)−(32) are the complementary slackness constraints,
(21)−(24) and (25) are the primal feasibility constraints, and
(33) represents the dual feasibility constraints.
Particularly, the complementary slackness constraints
(29)−(32) are nonlinear since they include product of con-
tinuous variables. We then linearize them by introducing
new binary variables δµ± , δα± , δβ± , and δγ± . For instance,
constraint (29) can be rewritten as
µ− −M · δµ− 6 0
H¯2 (θ
∗ + c) + PmaxK 6M
(
1− δµ−
)
µ+ −M · δµ+ 6 0
−H¯2 (θ∗ + c) + PmaxK 6M
(
1− δµ+
) (34)
where M is a large positive number. Constraints (30)−(32)
can be linearized using the same method. Particularly, for the
linearized forms of constraints (31) and (32), M1 and M are
different values and M1 M .
Using the approximate relaxation for the various constraints
as detailed above, we obtain the following equivalent single-
stage mixed-integer linear problem with the objective
max PKl − ζ
∑
n∈L
un (35)
subject to (17), (19), (21), (23)−(25), (27), (28), (33), (34),
and the linearized forms of constraints (30)−(32). Note that
since no real-time data is required in the above optimization
problem, the attacker can solve this step offline to determine
the switching attack line to trip and the attack vector c.
B. Step 2: Determine Initial Attack Vector
In this step, we determine the attack vector at events A1. As
stated earlier, c0, the attack vector at A1, is chosen to ensure
that the resulting load shifts lead to the optimal dispatch solved
in Step 1, i.e., P ∗G. To this end, we use a two-stage optimization
problem similar to Step 1 to determine c0. Note that since the
switching attack line and attack sub-graph are both determined
in Step 1, the dependency matrix between power injection and
voltage angle, i.e., H1 for the physical topology G at A1 is
known to the attacker, and the cyber loads are given by (10).
As stated in Section III, the attacker only has access to
the measurements inside S. Thus, the attacker cannot directly
obtain the whole system physical states θ0. However, assuming
BS and BNS represents the set of buses inside and outside
S, respectively. The vector of cyber loads resulting from an
unobservable attack satisfies the following relationship:
P¯D =
[
PBSD +H
BS
1 θ
BS
0 − H¯1BS
(
θBS0 + c
0
)
PBNSD
]
(36)
where PBSD is the vector of physical loads for all buses inside
S, PBNSD is that for all buses outside S, HBS1 and H¯BS1
represents the sub-matrices of H1 and H¯1 for the set of buses
inside S, respectively. For the physical system states θBS0 ,
attacker uses the estimated states θˆBS0 , to compute (36).
The two-stage optimization can be written as follows:
min ‖cL‖0 (37)
s.t. − τPBSD 6 H¯BS1
(
θˆBS0 + c
0
)
−HBS1 θˆBS0 6 τPBSD
(38)
‖cL‖0 6 N0 (39){
θ¯∗, P ∗G
}
= arg
{
min
θ¯,PG
ng∑
g=1
Cg (PGg)
}
(40)
s.t. AGN · PG − H¯1 · θ¯
=
[
PBSD +H
BS
1 θˆ0
BS − H¯1BS
(
θˆ0
BS
+ c0
)
PBNSD
]
(λ)
(41)
−PmaxK 6 H¯2θ¯ 6 PmaxK (µ−, µ+) (42)
PG = P
∗
G1 (α) (43)
where P ∗G1 is ng× 1 optimal generation vector solved in Step
1; α is ng × 1 dual variable vector of constraints (43). The
objective (37) is to minimize the l0−norm of the attack vector.
Constraint (37) represents load shift limitation. Constraints
(40)−(43) represent the second stage DCOPF problem, which
guarantees that the attack vector selected in the first stage
leads to the optimal dispatch P ∗G1. The l0−norm constraint
can be relaxed to a linearized l1−norm constraint as (26).
The objective can be represented as
∑
n∈L
un. This problem can
then be converted to a single stage optimization problem using
methods similar to those as in detailed Step 1.
C. Implementation
The method to construct an unobservable AC attack with
a DC attack vector has been introduced in [11] for FDI
attacks without topology alteration. In this paper, we focus
on constructing AC unobservable cyber-physcial attacks. The
procedure is as follows:
1) Solve the Step 1 optimization offline to obtain the
switching attack line t and the attack vector c.
2) Identify the attack sub-graph S with c and line t.
3) Launch the physical attack on the switching attack line.
4) Perform local SE inside S with slack bus chosen as one
arbitrary load bus in S to obtain θˆBS0 ;
5) Solve the Step 2 optimization problem to obtain c0;
6) For all load buses m inside S, set θ¯0m = θˆ0m + c0m;
7) For all non-load buses, since the net injections are not
changed, the nodal balance equations for each non-load
buses are
AmGNPG−Vm
∑
j∈B¯rm
Vj(Gmjcosθmj +Bmjsinθmj)=0 (44)
AmGNQG−Vm
∑
j∈B¯rm
Vj(Gmjcosθmj −Bmjsinθmj)=0 (45)
7where AmGN represents the m
th row of AGN , QG repre-
sents the reactive power generation vector, Gmj + iBmj
is the (m, j)th entry of the bus admittance matrix, and
θmj = θm − θj is the voltage angle difference between
bus m and j, B¯rm is the set of branches connecting to
bus m for G¯. These equations can be solved iteratively
with Newton-Raphson method.
8) After updating the cyber states for the non-load buses,
using equation (8) to calculate the AC attack for A1.
9) Repeat Steps 4)−7) (without solving Step 2 optimiza-
tion) to construct AC attacks with c for A2,...,T .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we test the effect of attacks designed with
the two-step attack strategy for a nonlinear system model. The
test system is the IEEE 24-bus reliable test system (RTS).
We assume: (i) the system is operating under optimal power
flow; and (ii) the loads of the system are constant and are
equivalent to the historic load data that is assumed to be known
to the attacker. To model realistic power systems, we assume
that there are congestions prior to the attack and the attacker
chooses one congested line as target to maximize power flow.
We use MATPOWER to run AC power flow and AC OPF.
The optimization problem is solved with CPLEX.
A. Solution for the attack designed with the attack strategy
The solution of the unobservable topology attack determined
by the two-step attack strategy is tested in this subsection.
In order to understand the worst-case effect of attacks, we
assume there is a line congested prior to the physical attack.
This is achieved in simulation by reducing the line rating to
95% of the base case power flow (apparent power) to create
congestion. We exhaustively test all 38 lines as targets in the
system and let ζ, the weight for the l1−norm term in the
objective in (35), be 1% of the original power flow on each
target line. Fig. 3 illustrates the maximal power flow (PF) and
attack size (# of buses in sub-graph) for load shift bounds
τ = 10%, total lines to physically attack NT = 1, and the l1-
norm constraint N1 = 0.06. The plot in Fig. 3(a) indicate the
flow attack end of system event S1 using attack vector from
event A1. In Fig. 3(a), we compare the physical power flow
(apparent power, we denote it as AC PF) in each line to the
power flow solved in linear model (we denote it as DC PF). In
Fig. 3(b), we plot the number of center buses, i.e., l0−norm
of the attack vector, and the total number of buses inside the
attack sub-graph for each target line.
From Fig. 3(a) we can observe that the attack vector deter-
mined by the two-stage optimization problem cause overflows
in 33 target lines in linear model, i.e., 86.84% of the attacks
are successful. For all such successful attacks, using the attack
vector to construct an attack in the nonlinear model, in Fig.
3(a), the AC PF in each line tracks DC PF solved with the
attack strategy. In particular, 2 cases with target lines 9 and
11, respectively, have no center buses, i.e., for these lines the
state-preserving attacks introduced in [6] suffice. In Fig. 3(b),
we can observe that 72.73% of the successful attacks can be
launched inside a sub-graph with less than 16 total buses.
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Fig. 4. Target Line 12 (Connecting Bus 8 - Bus 9) with τ = 10%.
In Fig. 4, we illustrate the effect of the l1−norm constraint
on the maximal power flow (Fig. 4(a)), the l1− and the
l0−norms of the attack vector (Figs. 4(b) and 4(c), respec-
tively), and the switching attack line (Fig. 4(d)) for target line
12 solved with Step 1 optimization. In each sub-figure, we
illustrate the two solutions: one with ζ (red) and the other
without ζ (black) in the objective function. From Figs. 4
(a)−(c), we can see that for the solutions without l1−norm
in objective (i.e., ζ = 0) as the l1−norm constraint is relaxed,
the maximal target line power flow as well as the l1− and
l0−norms of attack vector also increase. In contrast, for plots
with the l1−norm in the objective, the l1−norm ensures that
the vector with the smallest number of center buses is chosen.
This in turn implies that when the l1−norm in the objective
is tight, the resulting power flow may be smaller than that
obtained without such a constraint. These differences are
illustrated in Figs. 4(a)−(c). In Fig. 4(d), we demonstrate that
8the switching attack line chosen by the optimization problem
changes from line 2 to line 8 as the l1−norm constraint is
relaxed. In general, tripping line 8 requires a large load shift,
and thus, is only possible for larger l1−norm constraint as
then the cyber load changes can be distributed over a larger
number of load buses in the sub-graph.
B. Consequences of the attack in the nonlinear model
In this subsection, we select a typical case to demonstrate
the consequence of the unobservable state-and-topology cyber-
physical attack determined by the attack strategy in the non-
linear system model. In this case, the target line is line 12 with
τ = 10%, NT = 1, and N1 = 0.06. Under this condition, the
switching attack line is line 2.
For the chosen target line, after launching the physical
attack at A0 and injecting the initial cyber attack constructed
with c0 at A1, the active power generation dispatch for
generators at bus 7 and 13 change from 215.69 MW and
230.96 MW to 200.69 MW and 245.67 MW, respectively
(the dispatch of other generators remain unchanged). In the
following events, as the attacker continues to inject the AC
attacks constructed with attack vector c (determined by Step 1
optimization), the active power generation for these two set of
generators are maintained at these values. Fig. 5 demonstrates
the cyber and physical power flow variation during 20 system
events. From Fig. 5, we can observe that once the active
power generation dispatch changes to the optimal dispatch
and remains unchanged in the subsequent system events, the
physical overflow in the target line will be maintained by
injecting the AC attack constructed with attack vector c. The
heat accumulation may eventually cause this line to overheat
and then trip offline all the while remaining unobservable to
the control center.
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Fig. 5. Power Flow Variation on Line 12 During 20 System Events.
We compare the load shifts caused by the attacks in both
the linear and nonlinear system models and find that the load
shifts in the nonlinear system model track those in the linear
system model for most of the successful attacks. The only two
exceptions are for lines 13 (i.e., 20% load shift on a bus) and
23 (i.e., 15% load shift on a bus).
For the successful attacks with other target lines, we observe
similar attack consequences in the nonlinear model.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have introduced a class of unobservable
topology attacks in which both topology data and states for a
sub-graph of the network are changed by an attacker. We have
proposed a two-step attack strategy to maximize the power
flow on a target line subject to constraints on limited size of
attack sub-graph and limited load shifts. We have shown that
attacks designed with the proposed two-step attack strategy
can cause physical line overloads in the IEEE 24-bus RTS
even when the attack is subject to bounds on changes in load,
for both linear and nonlinear models. The proportion of the
successful attacks in the nonlinear system model is 86.84%,
which shows the vulnerability of the system to such attacks.
A potential countermeasure is to use historical data to
forecast and predict expected generation dispatch. The cyber
load patterns created by the attack will in general be different
from the normal load shift patterns that lead to the same
dispatch plan. Thus, such forecasting can lead to detection
of anomalies in both loads and dispatch.
An important extension to study is to understand the impact
of attacks when the attacker has access to topology and
generation data only for a sub-network. While our attack
model restricts data changes to a sub-graph, it still requires the
attacker to have knowledge of the complete system topology
and generation data. Yet another avenue is to study the worst-
case attacks that trip multiple switching attack lines and
maximize power flow on multiple target lines.
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